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What stands out in your post is the idea of “shaping rather than setting” requirements through the early stages. In the E-COMM case, the RFQ vendor discussions basically functioned as a structured feedback loop, allowing requirements to be refined without breaking fairness under Contract A.
Your mention of competitive dialogue is also interesting, because it highlights that E-COMM achieved some of the same benefits (like collaboration and clarification) without formally leaving the traditional Canadian procurement model. That balance between flexibility in practice and rigidity in structure is really what makes this case notable.Your discussion of reducing Contract A risks through early engagement is key. I’d add that E-COMM didn’t really eliminate Contract A risks, they shifted where those risks were managed. Instead of dealing with ambiguity during evaluation or contract award, they pushed it into structured market engagement phases, which is arguably where it can be managed more safely and iteratively.
Hello Chris,
Please find attached my assignment #1, I’m Looking forward to your feedback.
Thanks,
Imane Bey zekkoub
One thing I’d add is that in repair and maintenance contracts, the shift to outcome-based delivery also changes how risk is allocated between the organization and the vendor. While it creates space for innovation and preventative strategies, it also requires careful definition of what falls under “routine maintenance” versus larger capital-type repairs, so expectations stay clear on both sides. That balance is often what determines whether the model works smoothly in practice.
Cleaning in healthcare is a strong fit for this model, especially because it links directly to infection control rather than just task completion.
One thing I’d add is that the success of this approach would really depend on how clearly those “cleanliness standards” are defined and measured in practice. In healthcare environments, outcomes can be influenced by multiple factors, so having strong governance and agreed-upon performance metrics becomes just as important as the incentive structure itself.What stands out here is how this model changes the role of procurement from price negotiation to performance design. Instead of managing transactions, the focus shifts to defining outcomes and governance structures that support continuous improvement over time.
I like your point about freeing up internal resources. One thing I’d add is that in practice, the “win-win” depends a lot on how well demand is defined and monitored. If the outcome metrics aren’t carefully designed, you can end up shifting inefficiencies to the supplier rather than actually eliminating them. So the structure of what “efficient use” means becomes just as important as the outsourcing itself.
Good observation on the “slow down to speed up” idea! what stands out to me in the E-COMM case is that they didn’t just slow down informally, they actually built a structured mechanism (working groups, PoC, RFQ feedback loops) to ensure that the time invested in planning translated into actionable, converged requirements rather than open-ended discussion. In that sense, the process wasn’t just longer, it was deliberately engineered to reduce ambiguity before procurement risk peaked at the RFP stage.
What you both highlighted about flexibility at the end stage is interesting, especially in the context of Contract A. One thing I’d add is that in Canadian public procurement, the risk isn’t just the lack of flexibility, but the point at which flexibility starts to create unequal treatment between bidders. Even small post-closing negotiations can unintentionally shift the competitive balance, which is likely why E-COMM leaned so heavily on refining requirements before the RFP instead of during final negotiations.
One area where vested outsourcing could be particularly useful in a healthcare procurement context is the management of critical clinical supply availability across healthcare facilities. In traditional supply contracts, vendors are often paid based on transaction volume, meaning revenue increases with more orders and deliveries. As a result, there is limited incentive to reduce demand or improve overall system efficiency.
A vested outsourcing model would shift this by tying part of the vendor’s compensation to system-level outcomes rather than volume, such as reduced stockouts, improved availability of critical items, and fewer emergency or last-minute orders (which can be very expensive).
To make this effective, the contract would include a stable base payment with additional incentives linked to performance improvements, such as reduced waste, lower emergency procurement costs, or better inventory reliability across sites. This will change the incentive from “more orders” to “better system performance”.
It would also encourage vendors to take a more proactive role in analyzing usage patterns and anticipating demand rather than simply responding to purchase requests.The result would be a shift toward shared accountability for efficiency, reliability, and service continuity in supply contracts. Elements of this approach exist in performance-based contracts, but fully outcome-driven vested outsourcing is still not widely used in healthcare supply chains.
One of the aspects I found most interesting in the “E-COMM Emergency Communications for BC” procurement was how much emphasis they placed on refining their requirements before issuing the final RFP. Instead of assuming they knew exactly what they needed, they used the Proof of Concept, RFI, and RFQ stages to test the market, validate technology like P25, and incorporate feedback from both vendors and end users such as police and fire agencies. That stood out to me because it shows a very practical approach to managing uncertainty in complex procurements.
I also found the level of structure and governance notable. The involvement of multiple committees, along with fairness advisors, highlights how important transparency and accountability were, especially given the public safety implications of the project.
In terms of using the Contract A paradigm, I think it makes sense in this context because of the need for fairness and defensibility. That said, for a project of this size and complexity, I would consider whether more flexibility at the final stage (such as a more negotiated approach) could be beneficial.
Overall, I would likely take a similar phased approach, particularly the strong upfront market engagement, but I would keep in mind the balance between structure and flexibility to ensure the best possible outcome.
I think this is a very strong example of how outcomes-based commissioning could be applied in a meaningful way. I especially like the focus on long-term outcomes like housing stability and addressing root causes, rather than just measuring service usage. This is particularly relevant in contexts like Nova Scotia, where housing insecurity and pressure on emergency and transitional housing services continue to be important social challenges. It also highlights the importance of collaboration across housing, health, and social services to support individuals more holistically.
Your example of surgical wait times is very relevant, especially in the Nova Scotia context where access to timely care remains an ongoing pressure point. I agree that shifting the focus from volume to outcomes could drive meaningful improvements in system performance. One challenge, however, is ensuring there is enough provider capacity to maintain genuine competition, particularly in specialized healthcare services where options can be limited. Even so, using time-bound contracts could still help introduce accountability and encourage better performance within the existing system.
You make a strong case for waste management as a good fit, particularly given the clarity and measurability of outcomes. I agree that the presence of an established supplier market supports effective contestability. One additional consideration is how performance metrics are structured, ensuring they capture not just cost and efficiency, but also long-term environmental outcomes, will be key to avoiding unintended trade-offs.
One service I think lends itself well to outcomes-based commissioning is home care and long-term care support. In this area, outcomes like reduced hospital readmissions, improved patient well-being, and timely access to care can be clearly defined and measured. Giving providers more flexibility in how they deliver services could lead to more integrated and patient-centered solutions.
I also see value in how this approach supports contestability, since both private and non-profit providers could participate under time-bound contracts. This can help maintain competitive tension and encourage continuous improvement.
That said, I think implementation could be challenging. Defining the right outcome metrics and ensuring reliable data collection is not always straightforward, especially in healthcare where results can be influenced by multiple external factors. There’s also a risk that providers may focus too much on what is measurable and overlook less tangible aspects of care.
Overall, I think this approach has strong potential to improve service effectiveness, but only if outcomes are clearly defined and supported by strong oversight.
